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27 May 1964

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY

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Communist China - Southeast Asia: Peiping's endorsement of a conference on Southeast Asian problems appears aimed at further isolating the US and rendering any direct US intervention in Laos more difficult to justify.

In a letter to the Geneva co-chairmen on 26 May, Peiping proposed a meeting in Phnom Penh of foreign ministers from the 14 Geneva Conference participants. The conference would "first" discuss Laos, but it is clear that the Chinese hope to enlarge any talks to cover South Vietnam and Cambodia as well.

The Chinese cite the "increasingly grave" situation in Laos as the reason for their proposal. They charge, however, that US "aggression" against Cambodia and in South Vietnam endangers peace in the entire area.

By endorsing Cambodian Prince Sihanouk's proposal last month for an international conference and by citing the French call on 20 May for a meeting, which they described as "seconded" by the Soviet Union, the Chinese are attempting to show that most participants are agreed on the necessity for a meeting and that the US is the chief obstacle.


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*South Vietnam: North Vietnam is evidently sending police and security specialists into the south-central part of South Vietnam to strengthen the Viet Cong position there.

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[REDACTED] infiltration group consisted of security and administrative reinforcements and replacements for Viet Cong Military Region 6. The nature of this group tends to confirm previous indications of Viet Cong concern over their inability to develop greater assets in this sparsely populated area.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] the Communists believed their own forces in this area were lagging behind other areas of the country and that they planned remedial measures.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] all known Viet Cong infiltrators had been drawn from the estimated 90,000 southerners regrouped in the north following the 1954 Geneva Accords.

[REDACTED]

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Cyprus: [The rift between President Makarios and the top Greek Cypriot military leadership appears to be widening because of a dispute over the terms of a pending conscription bill to provide for a 25,000-man national guard.]

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[As drafted on Makarios' instructions, the bill authorizes private individuals to raise and control their own armed groups. It is scheduled to be introduced on 29 May, and apparently has enough support to be passed quickly.]

[The authorization of private armies is vigorously opposed by the recently appointed national guard commander--a retired Greek general--and by Cypriot Minister of Interior Georkatzis. Georkatzis is especially irate because it would legalize the activities of Makarios' left-leaning close associate, Vasos Lyssarides.]

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[Georkatzis and others had supported conscription, in place of voluntary recruitment, on the assumption that it would bring the many armed units under centralized, anti-Communist control. The Communists are supporting the bill as drafted.]

[The UN military commander and his political adviser, Galo Plaza, are agreed that unless the UN terms of reference are strengthened to include the interdiction of arms shipments into Cyprus, the situation on the island will become "well-nigh hopeless." Secretary General Thant may well decide to ask the council to give him this authority.]

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USSR-Rumania: A high-level Rumanian party delegation is in Moscow, probably in connection with the current anti-Soviet indoctrination campaign in Rumania and the Rumanian economic mission to the US.

It is not clear whether the visit is at Rumanian initiative or whether it reflects Soviet concern over recent Rumanian actions.

The delegation, which is headed by politburo member and specialist in international Communist relations Chivu Stoica, arrived yesterday. It ostensibly will study Soviet party methods of directing the economy. The Soviets, however, almost certainly will press the Rumanians to halt their personal abuse of Khrushchev.

The Rumanians may play down the significance of their recent actions, as they have with Western diplomats in Bucharest, but there are no signs that Bucharest is prepared to back away from its independent stand.

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South Korea: [Student leaders are planning to continue scattered demonstrations in an effort to provoke government repression.]

[redacted]
[redacted] retaliation against the demonstrators, particularly any brutality, will arouse the politically neutral majority of students and win mass support from the public. They have expressed the hope of gaining sufficient support to stage a massive demonstration this coming week end.]

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[The students are in close touch with politicians opposed to the Pak government, some of whom are supplying the students with funds. The politicians are content to let the students carry the ball for the moment. The Civil Rule Party is not pressing its earlier threat to attempt the impeachment of President Pak Chong-hui.]

[The government is divided on how it should act. The militant wing is sensitive to the inherent danger of permitting the demonstrations to continue, but others are concerned lest repressive measures arouse mass public opposition. The prime minister has claimed that the government will try to avoid imposing martial law, but he has warned there is a limit to the government's patience.]

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NOTES

Cuba-Spain: Spanish Foreign Minister Castiella has confirmed earlier indications that Cuba is seeking Spanish assistance in reaching a modus vivendi with the US. On 25 May, Castiella told US Ambassador Woodward that "important Spanish diplomats" had recently been approached by Cuban officials with this idea in mind. He emphasized that these Cuban moves were taken entirely on Havana's initiative.

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
India: Naga tribesmen in extreme eastern India have indicated their willingness to end their nine-year-old rebellion which has tied down a 40,000-man Indian police and army force. Naga leaders, however, will have considerable difficulty in obtaining full compliance with a cease-fire from their loosely knit force [of some 3,000 armed tribesmen]. The success of any further negotiations will depend largely on whether Naga leaders are willing to drop their demands for complete independence.

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Iraq-Egypt-Syria: The preliminary "unity" agreement between Egypt and Iraq announced yesterday is not likely to bring political union between the two countries appreciably closer. Important elements within the Iraqi regime are likely to resist strongly any attempt to subordinate parochial Iraqi interests to those of Egypt. The remarks of President Nasir at the ceremony marking the signing of the agreement indicate that it was largely designed to encourage pro-union elements in Syria, which is at odds with both Egypt and Iraq.

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France-UN: There is further evidence that France intends to take no chance of losing its voting rights in the General Assembly for being delinquent in paying its assessments to support the UN's peace-keeping operations. According to a French official in New York, Paris will make a cash "gift" to the UN in the amount equal to what it owes for the Congo operations, and perhaps a little more. In this way, France will preserve both its vote and its position that such assembly-authorized undertakings are illegal and therefore not financially binding on any UN members.

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*India: Jawaharlal Nehru died this morning at the age of 74, the victim of his second stroke in six months.

Nehru's most likely successor is Lal Bahadur Shastri, the 59 year-old minister without portfolio who has been carrying much of Nehru's work load since the latter's first stroke in January.

The successor will be formally chosen by the ruling Congress Party group in parliament, now gathering in New Delhi for a special parliamentary session which had been scheduled to open today. That session may be put off for a short mourning period and to allow time for informal party consultations between key national and state leaders.

Home Minister G. L. Nanda, not a serious candidate for the Prime Minister's post but the second-ranking cabinet member, may preside over the government until parliament makes its choice.

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The Secretary of the Army

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Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

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The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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